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Introduction
The introduction of quality certifications is an im-
portant part of the restructuring process taking place in
the agrifood sectors of transition and developing
countries (Reardon & Barrett, 2000). Introducing qua-
lity certifications in the agrifood value chain can be be-
neficial both for producers, who gain access to higher value
western markets and thereby increase their income, and for
buyers, who gain access to a larger quantity of products
with consistent quality (Trienekens & Zuurbier, 2008).
Adoption of private quality certifications has been
cited as a motivation for the use of contractual arrange-
ments rather than simple market arrangements (spot
market transactions). This is due to the fact that private
quality certifications are associated with both higher
asset specificity and higher transaction costs, which
result from monitoring and certification (Raynaud et
al., 2005). Emphasizing the relationship between quality
and vertical coordination, Goodhue et al. (2003) have
shown how quality issues that have relied on formal
written contractual arrangements have been important
in explaining the vertical relationship between buyers
and suppliers in the winegrape industry. Despite some
valuable publications that have focused on written
contractual arrangements, and hence have enhanced
the understanding of vertical relationships (Goodhue
et al., 2003; Fernández-Olmos et al., 2009), the rela-
tionship of transaction costs with the type of quality
certification and type of contractual arrangement has
received only limited attention.
Mesquita & Brush (2008) have explained that written
contractual arrangements present limitations because
they are incomplete. The reason is that contracting
parties will find it difficult and expensive not only to
foresee all the possible contingencies, but also to enfor-
ce these types of arrangements, especially when outcomes
are unobservable or non-verifiable by a third party (Hart,
1995). Therefore, because formal contracts are incom-
plete, both parties expose themselves to ex post costs
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related to performance and enforcement. As a feasible
alternative to reduce the ex post costs, relational con-
tractual arrangements based on social and economic rela-
tionships are used (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999). Rela-
tional contractual arrangements reflect the norms
(provisions and incentives) established by a repeated inter-
action between parties or within society (Guo & Jolly, 2008),
and therefore, counterweigh opportunism (Demsetz, 1993).
Increasing adoption of quality certifications has been
observed in the Mexican avocado (Persea americana
Mill.) industry where the possibility to export to the
US market has provided an incentive to enhance
product quality. Up until 1997, private quality certifi-
cations were only adopted by a select group of export
producers (Stanford, 1998). Since then, an increasing
number of producers have been adopting public quality
standards, and a smaller number of producers have been
adopting private quality certifications (Sánchez, 2007).
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact
of transaction costs1 and relationship characteristics
on the joint choice of contractual arrangements and
quality certif ications in the agrifood supply chains.
Two decisions are modeled using a bivariate probit
model. First, the type of arrangement will be explained
by the transaction costs, relationship characteristics, and
producer characteristics. Second, adoption of a particular
quality certification is modeled by transaction costs,
external and internal incentives, and producer characte-
ristics. A survey among avocado producers in the State
of Michoacan is constructed to obtain detailed informa-
tion on contractual arrangements and quality certifications.
Conceptual framework
Transaction costs are the costs of undertaking an ex-
change between buyer and supplier, and encompass all
aspects of the contractual relationship (Hobbs, 1996).
Rindfleisch & Heide (1997) identified three sources
of transaction costs: safeguarding specific asset, adap-
tation of the transaction to changing conditions (envi-
ronmental uncertainty), and performance evaluation
(behavioral uncertainty). Williamson (1985) argues
that uncertainty is only problematic in the presence of
specific assets. Thus, when transaction costs are pre-
sent and asset specificity is absent or low, economic actors
will favor market governance. However, if specific in-
vestments are high, firms will favor internal organiza-
tion (Geyskens et al., 2006). Between the extremes 
of market and internal organization, the hybrid can 
be found as a third category of governance structures
(Williamson, 1991; Ménard, 2004). The hybrid may
achieve the benefits of internal organization without
complete vertical integration, thus avoiding the burdens
of bureaucracy to which internal organization is subject
(Williamson, 2008).
Def ining both market governance and relational
governance and how they are related to the contractual
arrangements, Williamson (1991) explains that market
governance is one structure in which individual buyers
and sellers bear no dependency relation to one another.
Instead, each party can go its own way at a negligible
cost to the other. Under this form of governance, simple
market arrangements are more efficient for transac-
tions where the terms of the exchange can be relatively
easily defined (Raynaud et al., 2005), asset specificity
is low (Williamson, 1985), and transactors can be subs-
tituted at a very low cost (Ménard, 2002). On the contrary,
when individual actions have potential negative side
effects, are less observable, and are coupled with high
asset specif icity, the relative eff iciency of market
arrangements is reduced.
Relational governance is based on the proposition
that relational characteristics moderate the relationship
between asset specificity and negotiation costs (Artz
& Brush, 2000). This type of governance is better suppor-
ted by relational arrangements that do not attempt to
define the complete set of terms and conditions for the
entire frame of arrangement ex ante; rather, the presen-
ce of characteristics such as expectation of continuity
and commitment moderates the costs for periodic re-
negotiations (Geyskens et al., 2006) to adjust price,
quantity, and payment conditions during the life of the
arrangement (Ménard, 2002).
Transaction costs, governance structure,
relationship characteristics and quality
certifications
Transaction costs
As food safety and quality assurance affect the cost
of carrying out transactions, private companies have
an incentive to adopt voluntary quality assurance systems
1 Transaction costs are operationalized by transaction characteristics associated to asset specificity, environmental uncertainty and
behavioural uncertainty. The transaction characteristics are defined in Section “Data preparation”.
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(Holleran et al., 1999). Transaction costs are directly affec-
ted and may often be increased by food safety regula-
tions, product liability law, and customer requirements.
Quality certifications can mitigate the transaction costs
depending on their attributes (e.g., asset specificity,
behavioral uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty).
Perishable products such as fresh fruits and vege-
tables are subject to climatic uncertainty, which in-
fluences both the quality and the quantity of products
available. To reduce high perishability constraints and
achieve homogeneity of product quality, producers
invest in fine-tuning the production process to meet
the quality certif ication determined by the buyers
(Raynaud et al., 2005). The solution is adoption of
quality certif ications that consider aspects such as
specif ication of products and/or related production
processes, environmental concerns, human rights, and
social and ethical values. Furthermore, investments in
specific knowledge and physical assets are required.
Based on this solution, the hold-up problem is present
because adoption of a particular (private) quality
certification reduces the number of potential buyers
who require a specific product for a specific market
(Holmes et al., 2006), which could cause quasi-rent
expropriation and mal-adaptation hazards.
To mitigate the contractual hazards, a particular go-
vernance structure can be adopted. Noorderhaven (1994)
and Geyskens et al. (2006) have found that high asset
specificity leads to a preference for relational gover-
nance over market governance. Reducing contractual
hazards engaging in collaborative exchanges (i.e.,
relational governance) is a viable alternative to hierar-
chy. Relational governance modes are sustained by
relationship characteristics such as expectation of conti-
nuity, commitment, and information exchange (Lusch
& Brown, 1996). The following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 1: As asset specificity increases,
relational governance becomes preferred over
market governance
The problem of behavioral uncertainty is related to
performance evaluation, and two different problems
are identified: monitoring costs and enforcement costs
(Leiblein, 2003). Monitoring costs refer to the costs
associated with monitoring whether or not the partner
is complying with the agreement (Dyer, 1997). En-
forcement and verification costs refer to the costs asso-
ciated with ex post bargaining and with sanctioning a
trading partner who does not perform according to the
contract. Williamson (1991) has argued that relational
governance addresses behavioral uncertainty less effec-
tively than does market governance when asset specifi-
city is absent. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: As behavioral uncertainty increases,
market governance becomes preferred over
relational governance
Environmental uncertainty refers to unanticipated
changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange
that influences coordination costs (Noordewier et al.,
1990) and negotiation costs (Hobbs, 1997). Environ-
mental uncertainty has been measured in terms of de-
mand uncertainty, volume uncertainty, and price uncer-
tainty. Demand uncertainty is the supplier’s inability
to predict variations in the quantity and timing of demand.
Without this information, the supplier will be hesitant
to invest in production capacity for fear that s/he will be
stuck with costly excess if the projected sales do not
materialize (Anderson, 1985). Volume uncertainty is
defined as uncertainty in production or distribution of
the product (Noordewier et al., 1990), and this uncer-
tainty can occur as result of quality and production
process problems, unreliable lead-time, and inflexibi-
lity (Davis, 1993). Suppliers cannot access accurate
information on the quality attributes of the product and
buyers must deal with heterogeneous inputs of variable
qualities while at the same time, being able to deliver
a uniform and stable final product to consumer markets
(Raynaud et al., 2005). Price uncertainty occurs when pro-
ducers and buyers cannot access accurate information
about the quality attributes of the product; thus, rather than
reflecting the opportunity costs of production, the final
price may simply reflect the relative strength of bargaining
(Fafchamps et al., 2008; Kyeyamwa et al., 2008).
Williamson (1985) has argued that in the case of
environmental uncertainty and absent asset specificity,
market governance is preferred because of its low cost
and strong performance incentives. The following hy-
pothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3: As environmental uncertainty
increases, market governance becomes preferred
over relational governance
Relationship characteristics
Under relational governance, different characteristics
of the supplier-buyer relationship are identif ied to
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mitigate exchange hazards. Lusch & Brown (1996),
having distinguished between relational and market
governance, concluded that a significant and positive
relation exists between relational governance and each
of the variables: expectation of continuity, information
exchange, and buyer commitment. Gulati et al. (2005)
and Geyskens et al. (2006) have explained that the ex-
pectation of continuity has an important role in alig-
ning interests in relational governance, and therefore,
in safeguarding the level of transaction-specific invest-
ments incurred by the supplier with the main buyer.
Noordewier et al. (1990) have indicated that informa-
tion provided to suppliers clearly contributes to buyer
adaptability, and Dyer (1996; 1997) has added that
information is shared only when parties are under rela-
tional governance. Therefore, the following hypotheses
are proposed:
Hypothesis 4: A high level of expectation 
of continuity is more prevalent under relational
governance than under market governance
Hypothesis 5: A high level of buyer commitment 
is more prevalent under relational governance 
than under market governance
Hypothesis 6: A high level of information exchange
is more prevalent under relational governance 
than under market governance
Quality certifications and governance structure
Raynaud et al. (2005) define a quality standard as
a list of product specifications that translates into cons-
traints in the production/transformation process and
on the final quality. While suppliers may need to invest
or finely design their production process in order to
meet the quality certification, these requirements entail
increasing specif ic assets (Raynaud et al., 2005).
Distinguishing between public and private quality cer-
tifications, Raynaud et al. (2005) have mentioned that
public and private quality certifications rest on diffe-
rent enforcement mechanisms, and therefore, are asso-
ciated to different governance structures. Public quality
standards are market oriented because of lower levels
of asset specificity and lower costs of monitoring, in-
formation, and negotiation than with private quality
certifications (Ménard & Valceschini, 2005; Raynaud
et al., 2005). Particularly, Raynaud et al. (2005) have
identif ied that suppliers need to invest or re-design
their production process in order to meet private qua-
lity certifications, thus, increasing the physical specifi-
city of the assets invested. This condition gives rise to
relational governance, reducing observability and
traceability problems (Foss, 1996), so as to have more
ability to exercise decision control (Heide, 1994), as well
as to safeguard the asset specificity (Williamson, 1991).
The following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 7: Relational governance is positively




Relevance of the avocado industry in Mexico
Mexico is the world leader in production, consump-
tion, and export of fresh avocados (Sánchez, 2007).
The Mexican avocado industry has undergone nume-
rous changes in configuration since the non-tariff barriers
prohibiting Mexican fresh avocado exports to the US
market were eliminated2 and phytosanitary regulations
were introduced (Ortiz, 2007; Sánchez, 2007: 67). In
2008, Mexican avocado producers exported 30% of
their domestic avocado production, with the main
export market being the USA (importing more than
half of Mexican avocado exports).
Michoacan is the main avocado region in Mexico,
annually generating a harvested product value of more
than US$ 700 million, and providing 42,000 permanent
and 31,000 temporal jobs (Ramos, 2007). In terms of
production, Michoacan produces more than 800,000 tons
annually, on more than 75,800 ha, by approximately
11,700 avocado producers (Sánchez, 2007). Seventy-
two percent of the cultivated area and 66% of all avoca-
do producers are found in five municipalities: Nuevo
Parangaricutiro, Periban, Tancitaro, Uruapan, and Zira-
cuaretiro. Producers in the aforementioned places have
between 5.2 and 10 ha of land, and yield 10 tons ha–1.
2 On February 5, 1997, the ban on Mexican avocado imports into the USA was lifted. To allow exports of Mexican avocado into
the USA, the USDA requires verification of compliance for phytosanitary conditions, which is inspected by the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Services (APHIS). In addition, Mexican producers must follow a continual program of pest control (Sánchez,
2007: 49).
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The packer is the most important buyer for interna-
tional market destinations. The packers sector is more
concentrated than the producer sector, as it consists of
approximately 382 packaging houses located in Mi-
choacan. Only 60 of these firms export avocados and
only 26 of them export to the USA (Sánchez, 2007).
The 26 large packaging houses are characterized by
advanced technology and the use of quality systems
(i.e., good manufacturing practices). Each large firm
sells more than 8,000 tons of avocados per year, and
is supplied by, on average, 50 producers. In total, these
packaging houses process about one fourth of the
Mexican avocado production.
Avocado activity, quality certifications 
and contractual arrangements
In Mexico, avocado is a commercially valuable fruit
and is cultivated as a single crop. Mexican authorities
implement strict phytosanitary regulations so that the
Mexican avocado may be exported to different US mar-
kets. In addition, these regulations establish the legal
base for a system of regional phytosanitary control,
requiring every avocado producer to enter the state pest
control program and obtain certification for his orchards
if the intention is to market his fruit at regional packing-
houses (Dorantes et al., 2004).
Mexican avocado producers have adopted public and
private quality certifications (Sánchez, 2007). Public
quality certification, that is also named Public quality
standard, is mandatory by the Mexican phytosanitary
legislation (066-FITO-2002) for avocado producers
selling product to packaging houses. The Public quality
standard entails a number of phytosanitary require-
ments3 and producers entering a state phytosanitary
program are required to comply with technical re-
commendations at least one year prior to export in
order to receive the certification. Although the public
quality standards require a relatively complex imple-
mentation, technical assistance, monitoring, and certi-
fication activities are carried out by personnel of the
Local Plant Health Boards (JLSVs), a public-private
partnership of local producers and federal authorities
(SAGARPA). Costs for technical assistance and mo-
nitoring are supported by the state through the JLSVs,
whereas costs for certification are paid by the producer.
Private quality certif ication is voluntary, and it is
an additional step to Public quality standard. Thus,
producers must comply with private quality certif i-
cations if they wish to enter or remain within markets
which demand regulations such as US and European
certif ications on food safety and good agricultural
practices (US-GAP and Global-GAP), along with
organic produce certification. Private quality certifi-
cations are more complex than public quality stan-
dards4. Producers not only face high costs, but are also
required to have constant interaction with the packer
to resolve technical issues. The packing house puts
great effort in providing technical advice to its partner-
suppliers to keep them in compliance with current and
future quality requirements for both the product and
the process.
Producers are subject to the harvesting and payment
conditions that are determined by the packer. In con-
trast to other agrifood products, harvesting in the Me-
xican avocado industry is done by the packer, which
has caused both advantages and disadvantages for the
producer. While the packer, who directly gathers the
fruit, has reduced problems with quality of the product,
producers have cited damage to the avocado trees that
is caused by incorrect harvesting practices (Sánchez,
2007). Payment is another concern for avocado produ-
cers. The producer and the packer frequently establish
the payment conditions (i.e., price, ripeness and amount,
payment date) one day before harvesting. Based on
these conditions, payment is done on-site or during the
following two weeks after harvesting. Therefore, pro-
ducers may face non-fulfillment or deferment of pay-
ment, or non-fulfillment of the agreed price.
Producers use two types of arrangements; simple
contractual arrangements and verbal contractual arran-
gements (Stanford, 1998; Sánchez, 2007). Non-legal
terms are established to make the transactions for both.
Simple contractual arrangements or spot market
transactions are efficiently used by producers who have
3 The product must come from certified orchards; the packing houses must have a registration; and each avocado shipment must
carry a document stating that it originates from a registered orchard or packing house (Dorantes et al., 2004)
4 Producers must first purchase certification services, then incur compliance costs and undergo regular and repeated testing and
certif ication. In total, the producer must implement eleven practices related to soil and substrata management; fertilizer use;
irrigation system; crop protection; harvesting; produce handling; waste and pollution management; worker health, safety and
welfare; environmental issues; and complaint form. In addition, information from the packer such as size, weight, ripeness, and
color must be registered (Dorantes et al., 2004).
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adopted public quality standards, and in which amount,
price and date are specif ied. Approximately 5,250
producers commercialize their products under this type
of arrangement (Ramos, 2007). Thus, when producers
or buyers do not comply with agreed product quality
or purchasing conditions and harvesting activity has
not been met, both parties can easily find another tra-
ding partner. However, even with the transaction being
made, there is not guarantee that the packer will fulfill
his payment obligations; hence there is constant uncer-
tainty for the producer. In this context, producers have
mentioned that a written arrangement does not offer assu-
rance payment because of the time, cost, and effort that
is needed to enforce the legal terms of the arrangement.
Verbal arrangements based on commitment of tech-
nical assistance, input, credit, or expectation of conti-
nuity about future benefits have been used by produ-
cers who have adopted private quality certifications as
a means to influence the fulf illment of the arrange-
ment. Under private quality certif ications, the non-
complaint buyers would reduce their supplying sources
because the availability of alternative producers would
decrease, and thereby affect their contracts with
customers further down the supply chain.
Survey
The information required for testing the hypotheses
was collected through a survey of 122 Mexican avo-
cado producers. To estimate the sample size, the follow-
ing parameters were used; the level of precision is 5%,
the level of conf idence is 90%, and the estimated
proportion regarding the type of quality certification
adopted is 0.10. As result, the sample size was 130.
However, eight questionnaires presented inconsistencies,
and therefore, 122 questionnaires were finally used.
The avocado producers were randomly selected based
on multistage cluster sampling from the most impor-
tant avocado municipalities in the State of Michoacan:
Uruapan, Nuevo Parangaricutiro, Periban, Tancitaro,
and Ziracuaretiro. Unlike the final four municipalities,
avocado producers located in Uruapan present condi-
tions that facilitate avocado commercialization. Based
on these five municipalities, two sources were used to
select the producers. The first source comes from JLSVs.
In each municipality, the boards have a record of pro-
ducer characteristics such as name, property size, and
fulf illment of phytosanitary norms (e.g., non-regis-
tered, registered, certified producer5). Thus, from 11,727
producers included in the source, producers that have
been certified and are located in one of the five muni-
cipalities listed were selected. As a result, 3,851 produ-
cers fulfilled with the previous two characteristics. The
second source comes from the avocado producers asso-
ciation that also registers every member per munici-
pality. In this latter source, we can find avocado pro-
ducer characteristics such as the private quality
certif ication adopted (i.e., US-GAP, Global-GAP or
Organic certification), name, and property size. In this
case, 385 producers adopting private quality certifications
are located in the five previously mentioned municipa-
lities (Sánchez, 2007). A list was made including the
final number of producers from the two sources. Later,
producers were randomly selected by municipality6.
By mean of JLSVs, avocado producers were contacted
and personalized interviews were requested. From these
122 avocado producers, 94 are phytosanitary standard
adopter producers and 28 private quality certification
adopter producers (see Table 1).
The survey was conducted from February to April
2008 by trained enumerators that were supervised by
the first author, using a structured questionnaire. The
questionnaire covered specific information on producer
characteristics, adoption of quality certifications, type
of arrangement, transaction characteristics, relation-
ship characteristics, and external and internal incentives.
Estimation procedure
To test the hypotheses, a bivariate probit model was
used. Previous studies about contractual arrangements
(Fernández-Olmos et al., 2009) and quality certifica-
tions (Goodhue et al., 2003) have used univariate models.
However, Raynaud et al. (2005) have explained that
5 According to Phytosanitary Program, Local Plant Health Boards classify the avocado producers in three categories, non-registered,
registered, and certified producers. Non-registered producers don’t apply any phytosanitary requirement and they cannot sell their
product to the packaging houses. Registered producers are included in the Phytosanitary Program list, and they apply pest control
practices in their orchard during one year or more. Certified producers are included in the Phytosanitary Program list, and because
they have fulfilled with phytosanitary requirements, by one year or more, their orchard are certified as “pest free”. In this case, the
producers can sell their product to any packaging house.
6 Producers for municipality are: 64 in Uruapan, 28 in Nuevo Parangaricutiro, 12 in Periban, 10 in Tancitaro, and 10 in Ziracuaretiro.
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the decision to adopt a specific quality certif ication
was based on an aligned decision with a particular type
of governance choice. Based on the bivariate probit
model, it is analyzed whether transaction costs and
relationship characteristics, as independent variables,
were related to the type of contractual arrangement,
and whether transaction costs and external and internal
incentives were related to the type of quality certifica-
Table 1. Summary of variables
Type of quality standard
Type Public Private
Total
of variable standard standard
Independent variable
M SD M SD M SD
Observations 94 28 122
Asset_sp Ordinal 4.14 1.79 5.75 1.74 4.51 1.90
BU_payment Ordinal 2.97 1.99 3.18 2.52 3.02 2.12
BU_damage Ordinal 3.27 2.26 3.75 2.27 3.38 2.26
EU_price Ordinal 5.01 2.04 5.11 1.97 5.03 2.02
EU_demand Ordinal 2.86 1.70 13.18 1.83 2.93 1.72
EU_volume Ordinal 4.15 1.73 4.46 1.88 4.22 1.76
Gender (female = 1, male = 0) Nominal 0.19 0.40 0.07 0.26 0.16 0.37
Education (primary school = 1, Nominal 0.59 0.50 0.18 0.39 0.49 0.50
higher education = 0)
Experience (producer experience in years) Interval 20.57 12.18 19.29 10.89 20.28 11.86
Family size (members) Interval 5.06 2.59 5.61 2.23 5.19 2.52
Association member (yes = 1, not = 0) Nominal 0.38 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.43
Channel (export = 1, otherwise = 0) Nominal 0.40 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.43 0.50
Location (location of property, Uruapan = 1, Nominal 0.62 0.49 0.21 0.42 0.52 0.50
otherwise = 0)
Packer (certified packer = 1, otherwise = 0) Nominal 0.61 0.49 0.86 0.36 0.66 0.47
Price (average price in pesos kg–1) Interval 10.81 3.46 13.48 3.6 11.42 3.64
Sales (thousand pesos year–1) Interval 1,206 3,329 2,604 2,407 1,527 3,187




of variable arrangement arrangement
Independent variable
M SD M SD M SD
Observations 30 92 122
Asset_sp Ordinal 3.42 1.76 4.87 1.81 4.51 1.90
BU_payment Ordinal 3.27 1.95 2.93 2.17 3.02 2.12
BU_damage Ordinal 2.87 2.10 3.54 2.30 3.38 2.26
EU_price Ordinal 6.13 1.17 4.67 2.11 5.03 2.02
EU_demand Ordinal 2.00 1.11 3.24 1.78 2.93 1.72
EU_volume Ordinal 4.00 1.91 4.29 1.71 4.22 1.76
Information Ordinal 1.53 1.58 2.81 2.21 2.50 2.14
Buyer_commitment Ordinal 1.31 1.29 1.88 1.82 1.74 1.72
Continuity Ordinal 0.94 1.00 1.62 1.54 1.45 1.45
Gender (female = 1, male = 0) Nominal 0.23 0.43 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37
Education (primary school = 1, Nominal 0.60 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.50
higher education = 0)
Experience (producer experience in years) Interval 21.93 12.07 19.74 11.81 20.28 11.86
Family size (members) Interval 5.93 2.80 4.95 2.38 5.19 2.52
M: mean. SD: standard deviation. Source: Author’s survey.
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tion adopted. Studies about agrifood quality certifica-
tions refer to transaction costs (Holleran et al., 1999)
and external and internal incentives (Holleran et al.,
1999; Fouayzi et al., 2006) as explanatory variables
for deciding on a specific type of quality certification.
Because transaction costs and relationship characte-
ristics are not readily measurable (Hobbs, 1996), pre-
vious studies used proxy dimensional constructs, as
variables, integrating several items (Noordewier et al.,
1990; Heide & John, 1992; Dahlstrom et al., 1996;
Lusch & Brown, 1996). Therefore, Factor Analysis is
used to evaluate the significance of each construct in
terms of individual item reliability, internal consis-
tency, and discriminant validity [see a more detailed
explanation on Suppl. Table 1 (pdf)]. In case of no-sig-
nificance, items regarding their construct are separa-
tely included as independent variables in the bivariate
probit model. The rest of the independent variables,
external and internal incentives, and producer charac-
teristics, are singly included. Thus, all independent
variables of their respective dependent variable are
considered in the first block (full model) to determine
their significance, and afterwards, a step down proce-
dure is used to fit the model.
Bivariate probit model
Because the producer must make two decisions, type
of arrangement7 (Arrangement) and type of quality
certification (Quality), a bivariate probit model8 was
used, i.e., two separate binary dependent variables are
modeled. The type of arrangement (Arrangement) is
explained by a vector of independent variables9 (x1i):
transaction characteristics, relationship characteristics,
and producer characteristics. The type of quality certi-
fication (Quality) is modeled by a vector of indepen-
dent variables (x2i): transaction characteristics, external
and internal incentives, and producer characteristics.
The specification for the two equation model is:
Arrangement* = γ’1x1i – u1 [1]
Quality* = γ’2x2i – u2 [2]
where: Arrangement* and Quality* are latent variables,
and Arrangement and Quality are dichotomous varia-
bles with the following rules:
Arrangement = 1 if Arrangement* > 0, 0 otherwise
Quality = 1 if Quality* > 0, 0 otherwise
The error terms are assumed to be independently
and identically distributed as bivariate normal:
E(u1/x1i, Arrangement, x2i)= E(u2/x1i, Arrangement, x2i)=0
Var(u1/x1i, Arrangement, x2i)= Var(u2/x1i, Arrangement, x2i)=1
Cov(u1/u2, Arrangement, x2i)= ρ
where ρ is the correlation between the error terms in
the equations. In other words, ρ measures the correla-
tion between the outcomes after the influence of the
included variables is accounted for.
Data preparation
Dependent variables
The type of arrangement (Arrangement) refers to
the product sale between producer and buyer, and has
two outcomes. A relational arrangement (Arrange-
mentR) will be chosen by the producers if a verbal tran-
saction is made, and a simple market arrangement
(ArrangementS) will be chosen if a spot market transac-
tion is established. A dummy variable will be used, with
1 for relational arrangement and 0 for simple arran-
gement.
The avocado producer was directly asked about his
choice of adopted quality certification (Quality); and
four quality certifications were identified: organic cer-
tif ication, Global-GAP, US-GAP and phytosanitary
standard. The first three are considered as private qua-
lity certifications, and it is assumed that they result in
higher transaction costs than does the phytosanitary
quality standard, which is considered to be a public
quality standard. A dummy variable will be used, with
the value of 1 for private quality and with a value of 0
for public standard.
Independent variables
Asset specificity (Asset_sp) was initially measured
by three items (description of the items is presented in
Table 2), Asset_sp_knowledge, Asset_sp_ investment,
7 In the present research, market governance is viewed as a simple arrangement, and relational governance as a relational arrangement.
8 As noted by Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003), a bivariate probit model enables us to simultaneously model the process, and
potential selection bias can be corrected by assuming a joint normal error distribution using a two-step procedure.
9 Constructs of independent variables such as asset specificity, buyer commitment, expectation of continuity, and information
exchange are indicated in Table 2.
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and Asset_sp_buyer (Dahlstrom et al., 1996). However,
Asset_sp_buyer (i.e., producer loses part of his invest-
ment when he switches to another buyer) was not a
significant item in the construct; hence the final two
were used. The items were measured using a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from “not agree at all” to
“totally agree”.
Behavioral uncertainty was initially measured by
two items: BU_payment and BU_damage (see Table 2).
However, because individual item reliability (loadings)
Table 2. Constructs and items used in the bivariate probit model
Constructs Loading
Asset specificity (α = 0.74)
Asset_sp _knowledge 0.90
We have made significant investments in training of workers and in equipment specific for our main buyer
Asset_sp _investment 0.93
We have made significant investments in fulfillment of production requirements for our main buyer
Behavioral uncertainty (α = 0.58)
BU_payment 0.99
We are uncertain whether our buyer will stick to the payment arrangement
BU_damage 0.52
We are uncertain whether our buyer will damage the orchard
Environmental uncertainty  (α = 0.34)
EU_price 0.90
The price for my product varies significantly over the seasons
EU_demand 0.62
The demand for my product varies significantly over the seasons
EU_volume 0.31
The harvested volume per hectare varies significantly
Information exchange (α = 0.85)
Information_planning needs 0.74
We receive information to help us plan according to his/her needs
Information_frequency 0.87
We are frequently informed of his/her product requirements
Information_forecasting 0.68
We are provided with long-range forecasts of supply requirements
Information_in advance 0.80
We are informed in advance of impeding changes in preferences and requirements
Buyer commitment (α = 0.85)
Buyer commitment _helping 0.70
Our main buyer tries to help us when we incur problems
Buyer commitment _sharing 0.74
Our main buyer shares in the problems that arise in the course of dealing
Buyer commitment _improving 0.68
Our main buyer is committed to improvements that benefit our relationship
Buyer commitment _assistance 0.84
Our main buyer has supported us with technical assistance and inputs
Expectation of continuity (α = 0.67) 
Continuity_long time 0.85
We expect our relationship to continue a long time
Continuity_renewal 0.73
Renewal of the relationship is virtually automatic
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for BU_damage was lower than 0.710 (Table 2), items
were included separately in the model. Again, a seven-
point Likert scale was used.
Environmental uncertainty was initially measured
by three items (Table 2): EU_price, EU_demand,
EU_volume. However, because individual item reliabi-
lity (loadings) for EU_demand and EU_volume were
lower than 0.7, and the composite reliability for the
environmental uncertainty construct was lower than
0.7 [see Suppl. Table 2 (pdf)], items were separately
included in the model. A seven-point Likert scale was
used.
Buyer commitment (Buyer commitment) refers to
the willingness of the buyer to work together to create
a positive exchange relationship and improve the per-
formance of alliances (Heide & John, 1992). Four items
measured by a seven-point Likert scale are considered
for its construction (Table 2). This construct was in-
cluded as a variable.
Expectation of continuity (continuity) indicates the
degree to which the supplier is dependent on the buyer
(Lusch & Brown, 1996). Two items were used to mea-
sure this construct (Table 2), each one using a seven-
point Likert scale. This construct was included as a
variable in the model.
Information exchange (information) refers to long-
term forecasting, structural planning information, in-
cluding future product design information, and produc-
tion planning- schedules (Noordewier et al., 1990).
Four items were used to measure this construct (Table 2),
each one using a seven-point Likert. This construct was
included as a variable in the model.
External incentives (association member, channel,
location, and type of packer) suggest that firms adopt
quality certif ications imposed by major customers,
whereas internal incentives (price, sales, and yield)
show that firms adopt quality certifications to increase
their benef its or eff iciency (Holleran et al., 1999;
Fouayzi et al., 2006). Regarding external incentives,
Holleran et al. (1999) affirm that buyers play a main
role defining the product quality requirements. Wollni
& Zeller (2007) found that producers participating as
members of a cooperative increase the probability of
participation in specialized markets. In terms of loca-
tion, Raynaud et al. (2005) have mentioned that if
producers have alternative processing companies with
whom they can do business and an equal distant apart,
the bilateral dependency is limited; therefore, a signi-
f icant positive relationship is expected between a
location where a high number of packaging firms are
located, and there is adoption of public quality stan-
dards. According to the survey, four dummy indepen-
dent variables regarding location were introduced in
the model. For each dummy independent variable, two
mutually exclusive choices were considered; 1 = Urua-
pan and 0 = otherwise, 1 = Periban and 0 = otherwise,
1 = Tancitaro and 0 = otherwise, and 1 = Ziracuaretiro
and 0 = otherwise. In terms of internal incentives, a
price premium (price) is a necessary condition to cover
the extra costs associated with the higher quality of the
product; the producer has an incentive to attain the ex-
pected high quality (Klein & Leffler, 1981; Fouayzi et
al., 2006). Price, sales, and yield are interval variables,
and they indicate the average value during the season
2007.
Characteristics of the producer such as education,
experience, family size, and gender are expected to
influence the adoption of quality certif ications. The
variables education and gender are nominal variables
while experience and family size are interval variables.
Wollni & Zeller (2007) found that education and expe-
rience are associated to marketing channels that require
higher quality certifications.
A summary of the variables included in the two
equations is given in Table 1. The table shows that price
uncertainty (EU_price) has a high mean value compa-
red to the other environmental uncertainty variables.
The avocado producers involved in both types of qua-
lity certifications have indicated that price is a relevant
variable in the transaction with the packers. Price is
negotiated daily and large-scale avocado producers are
preferred by international packaging firms.
The following presents the producer characteristics
belonging to the sample. On average, the 122 avocado
producers had around twenty years of farming expe-
rience, but this is slightly higher for producers who
adopted public quality standards. The average family
size consisted of f ive. Fifty percent of the surveyed
producers participated in the most important avocado
association in Mexico, and their participation was
slightly higher when there was adoption of private qua-
lity certifications. Price uncertainty was higher and asset
specificity was lower for producers using simple arran-
gements than for producers using relational arrange-
10 According to Yurdugül (2008), individual reliability, as assessment measure of a dimensional construct integrating several items,
is acceptable if the value is grater or close to 0.7, when the sample size is equal to or larger than 100 observations.
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ments. In terms of the three relationship characteristics
used in the present research, there was a higher average
of producers using relational arrangements.
In terms of correlation, the variables did not exhibit
great correlation of 0.45. Based on the low correlations
among the measures, the possibility of criterion conta-
mination can be more or less ruled out.
Results
Results of the bivariate probit regression model are
presented in Table 3. Mc Fadden’s Adj R2 value was
0.26 indicating a good model fit (Greene, 2003). As
an additional measure of goodness of fit, the percen-
tage of correct predictions of the bivariate probit model
was 68%.
In the first decision of the model, type of arrange-
ment, asset specif icity (Asset_sp) had a signif icant
positive relation with the type of relational governance,
thus supporting hypothesis 1. The coefficients for the
two items reflecting behavioral uncertainty, BU_pay-
ment and BU_damage, were not significant in explai-
ning the type of arrangement; and thus, hypothesis 2
is not supported.
In terms of environmental uncertainty, EU_price
had a signif icant negative relation with relational
governance, which is consistent with hypothesis 3.
However, EU_demand had a signif icant positive
impact on relational governance, which is not con-
sistent with hypothesis 3. EU_volume was not a signi-
f icant variable. Thus, EU_price is the only variable
that corresponds to the transaction costs findings. i.e.,
a lower level of price uncertainty is present when
producers use relational governance as opposed to
when producers use market governance.
The variable expectation of continuity (continuity)
had a significant positive effect on the adoption of re-
lational arrangement, and therefore, hypothesis 4 is
supported. The coeff icients of the variables buyer
commitment and level of information were not signi-
ficant, and therefore, hypotheses 5 and 6 are not supported.
Table 3. Determinants of type of arrangement and adoption of quality standards (Seemingly




Dependent variable = arrangement
Asset_sp 0.6900012 0.001 0.001
EU_price –0.2868706 0.005 0.003
EU_demand 0.2810726 0.007 0.005
Continuity 0.5881243 0.015 0.015
Constant 1.6715170 0.013
Dependent variable = quality standard
Asset_sp 0.7063186 0.001 0.001
Location –1.1089480 0.001 0.001
Price 0.1059356 0.020 0.015
Education –0.7560213 0.024 0.016
Constant –1.4582090 0.017
Wald test of rho = 0: χ2(1) = 5.54291 Prob > χ2 = 0.019
Observations 122
Log likehood (only the constant) –128.12
Log likehood (constant and explanatory variables) –86.29
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.33
Mc Fadden’s Adj R2 0.26
a Variables EU_volume, BU_payment, BU_damage, information, Buyer_commitment, experience,
education, family size and gender were included to explain Arrangement; however, they were not
significant at 10%; and variables EU_price, EU_demand, EU_volume, BU_payment, BU_damage,
experience, family size, gender, association member, channel, packer, yield and sales were inclu-
ded to explain quality standard; however, they were not significant at 10%. b All the variables are
significant at p < 0.05. c Marginal change in probabilities at the sample means.
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In terms of correlations, the Wald test reveals that
the null hypothesis = 0 was rejected at 5%, which
means that the errors of the two separate probit equa-
tions are related, and a significant positive correlation
exists between type of arrangement and type of quality
certification (thus supporting hypothesis 7). Therefore,
the bivariate probit model generates consistent esti-
mates using standard maximum likelihood (see Table 3).
The second decision of the model, adoption of qua-
lity certification, was explained by such variables as
asset specif icity, price (internal incentive), location
(external incentive), and education. Whereas asset spe-
cificity and price have a significant positive effect on
the choice of private quality certification, location and
education had a significant negative effect. Location
is a nominal variable with two categories. Producers
with orchards in Uruapan prefer to adopt phytosanitary
standards, whereas producers with orchards in munici-
palities such as Nuevo Parangaricutiro, Periban, Tanci-
taro, and Ziracuaretiro adopt private quality certif i-
cations. Education is a nominal variable with two cate-
gories. Producers with an education level no higher
than primary school adopt public quality standards,
whereas producers with an education level higher than
primary school adopt private quality certif ications.
Other independent variables measuring the transaction
costs, known as behavioral uncertainty (BU_payment
and BU_damage) and environmental uncertainty
(EU_price, EU_demand, and EU_volume), were not
significant to explain the dependent variable quality.
It was shown that transaction costs did not influence
the decision about what quality certification was adop-
ted. The rest of independent variables, sales, yield,
association member, channel, type of packer, and pro-
ducer characteristics (experience, family size, and
gender) were also included to explain the dependent




Empirical results from the study support the main
TCE argument that asset specificity is related with the
type of governance structure. When producers make
specialized investments, they tend to safeguard these
investments by relying on relational governance as
shown by the expectation of continuity, which will be
discussed later on. Although previous studies on tran-
saction costs support the notion that specific gover-
nance such as written arrangements are eff icient at
safeguarding specific investments, this type of arrange-
ment presents limitations (Mesquita & Brush, 2008).
Mexican avocado producers have expressed that it is
expensive and time consuming to enforce written
arrangements. On the contrary, relational arrangements
in which parties have frequently agreed upon transac-
tions have been an efficient strategy in safeguarding
specific investments.
Demand uncertainty has a significant positive re-
lation with relational governance, while the relation
between price uncertainty and relational governance
is negative. Results regarding the relationship between
environmental uncertainty and governance structure
have been mixed in prior research (Walker & Weber,
1984; Heide & John, 1990). The significant positive
relationship between demand uncertainty and relatio-
nal governance was also obtained by Fynes et al.
(2004), who showed that a high level of demand uncer-
tainty is associated with a tighter relationship between
supply chain members. High level of demand uncer-
tainty can lead either to excesses or shortages in inven-
tory, both of which will be more easily prevented through
relational governance structure than through market
governance.
In regards to price uncertainty, the study showed a
significant negative relation to the adoption of relatio-
nal governance proving Dwyer & Welsh (1985) and
Heide & John (1990) who also found a significant ne-
gative relationship. Williamson (1996, p. 116) argued
that although there is efficacy in relational governance,
adaptations of it cannot be made unilaterally (as with
market governance) or by fiat (as with hierarchy), but
rather, require mutual consent. In other words, to conti-
nue the relationship, different aspects may be negotia-
ted, and rely on incentive provisions to encourage
motivation (Artz & Brush, 2000). Whereas Mexican
avocado producers using relational arrangements have
gained more price certainty, buyers have been hesitant
to commit to purchasing a specified quantity of product.
Therefore, buyers support their producer’s relationship
by paying prices according to the product quality, and
at the same time, they leave open the quantity and timing
of orders to manage their exposure to demand changes.
In the present research, behavioral uncertainty, which
was analyzed using two variables, was not significant
in explaining the type of governance structure. Two
possible reasons can explain this result. First, obser-
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vations with higher values for measures of behavioral
uncertainty were not large enough to contrast with the
rest of the data, and therefore, the measures were not
statistically signif icant (Greene, 2008). Second, the
two measures of behavioral uncertainty were not
serious problems for the producers.
In terms of relationship characteristics, the expecta-
tion of continuity has a significant positive relation
with the adoption of relational governance, the same
conclusion that was obtained by Lusch & Brown (1996).
Avocado producers adopting relational governance
have a high expectation of sustained benefits, and they
expect to continue selling their product to the same
buyer even in a context of abundant supply. The rest
of the relationship characteristics, information exchan-
ge and commitment were not significant. Therefore,
the efficient mechanism through which avocado produ-
cers mitigate exchange hazards is through the expecta-
tion of sustained benef its, not a repeated exchange
based on information or commitment between partners
to support the relationship (Geyskens et al., 2006).
Remaining independent variables, gender, producer
experience, family size, and education were included
to explain the dependent variable arrangement; however,
none resulted significant.
Quality certification
Asset specificity also had a significant positive rela-
tion to private quality certifications. Producers adopting
organic quality certification, US-GAP, or Global-GAP
invest in the training of workers and specific equip-
ment, along with the fulfillment of production requi-
rements for their buyer. In this context, because of few
alternative buyers (Raynaud et al., 2005), the producers
could face opportunism and receive a price that does
not correspond to the product quality. This can explain
why relational governance had a significant positive
correlation with the adoption of private quality certi-
fications. Raynaud et al. (2005) have explained that
private quality certifications require a more complex
governance structure than do public quality standards
because of higher asset specificity and higher transac-
tion cost resulting from monitoring and certifying.
Particularly in the Mexican avocado industry, simple
contractual arrangements are used by producers when
they adopt public quality standards. Under simple con-
tractual arrangements, a standardized product is supplied
and producers sell their product looking for the best
price. Under these circumstances, producers fulf ill
public quality standards (phytosanitary requirements)
and do not make specific knowledge or investment to
commercialize their avocado. By contrast, verbal con-
tractual arrangements are used when producers adopt
private quality certifications such as organic quality
certification, US-GAP, and Global-GAP. Verbal arran-
gements can guarantee producers that the buyers will
continue with the business relationship.
In addition, price, location, and education are signi-
ficant variables explaining the adoption of a quality
certification. Price is positively related to the adoption
of private quality certifications. A negotiated premium
has been the main incentive in covering the extra costs
associated with the higher quality of the product.
Avocado producers adopting private quality certif i-
cations, such as organic quality certification, US-GAP,
and Global-GAP, have received a higher price than avo-
cado producers who have only adopted phytosanitary
standards (Sánchez, 2007). Unfortunately, the present
questionnaire only considers prices measured in 2007.
Even so, if these prices are used as an independent va-
riable, it could show a simple relationship with the type
of quality certification adopted. Location is negatively
related to adoption of private quality certifications. It
means that producers in Uruapan prefer to adopt public
standards, whereas producers located in Nuevo Paran-
garicutiro, Periban, Tancitaro or Ziracuaretiro are better
to adopt private quality certif ications. As a possible
explanation, Sánchez (2007) refers to the number of
alternative buyers that producers have to market their
product. Producers located in Uruapan have a sig-
nificant number of packaging houses and other buyers
requiring avocado certified with phytosanitary standards,
compared to producers located in Nuevo Parangari-
cutiro, Periban, Tancitaro, and Ziracuaretiro. In the last
four municipalities, producers with few alternative
buyers have marketed their product with packers de-
manding an avocado certified with private quality cer-
tifications. In terms of education, avocado producers
with higher education (i.e., more than primary school)
adopt private quality certifications. The reason is that
producers with higher education have more experience
in dealing with agricultural tasks and recognizing
potential economic benefits through adoption of pri-
vate quality certifications.
The present study provides insights about the impact
of transaction costs and relationship characteristics on
the joint choice of contractual arrangements and quality
certifications. Unlike previous studies which used uni-
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variate models to show how transaction costs influence
the vertical coordination when quality issues are consi-
dered, the present analysis uses a bivariate probit model
to show explicitly how the transaction costs can impact
the joint choice of contractual arrangements and quality
certifications. In addition, because transaction costs
and relationship characteristics are not readily measu-
rable, proxy dimensional constructs are used as varia-
bles integrating several items. Thus, in order to gain
access to US and other western markets, Mexican avo-
cado producers have followed two investment strate-
gies that are related to specific types of quality certifi-
cations and types of arrangements. Whereas avocado
producers adopting private quality certifications invest
in a high level of specif ic assets and use relational
arrangements, avocado producers adopting phytosani-
tary quality standards do not invest or rather, invest
little in specific assets and use spot market transac-
tions. Theoretical explanations are found in transaction
cost economics, which predicts that the need for safe-
guarding transaction-specific investments is an impor-
tant driver for governance structure choice. Thus, Me-
xican avocado producers using relational arrangement
support their relationship with packers on expectation
of continuity to reduce price uncertainty, along with
safeguarding specific investments. Unlike other studies
that analyze how formal written arrangements safe-
guard specific assets, the present study focuses on re-
lational arrangements to explain how expectation of
continuity is an important relationship characteristic
reducing opportunism. In addition, relational arrange-
ments allow avocado producers to have more price cer-
tainty according to the quality attributes of the product,
whereas buyers have more freedom determining the
product demand. The present study also shows that
price, education, and location are relevant characte-
ristics that determine whether avocado producers adopt
a particular quality certification. Thus, whereas price
is an important incentive, education gives avocado
producers the experience to facilitate the adoption of
private quality certifications. Regarding location, avo-
cado producers located in municipalities with few al-
ternatives for processing companies, have more incen-
tives to adopt private quality certifications as a strategy
to get a price that corresponds to the quality of the product.
Finally, implications of this research should be eva-
luated in light of the following limitation. Although
the sample of producers used was large enough to eva-
luate and obtain significant results in most hypotheses,
it presents limitations in terms of the representati-
veness of the data. Although the sample of producers
included respondents from different property sizes and
different municipalities, most respondents came from
the central avocado production region in Mexico, which
has a network of supporting institutions, many poten-
tial buyers, and close proximity to export packaging
firms. Therefore, the results are more representative
for the avocado industry in that region.
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